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graphie historique d’une belle inspiration 
et bien fondée dans les sources. Sa valeur 
particulière est de rendre visible au public 
européen une personnalité marquante et 
un destin insuffisamment connu.
Darko Tanasković, neoosmanizam. povratak turske na Balkan 
[Neo-Ottomanism. Turkey’s Return to the Balkans]. Belgrade: 
JP Službeni glasnik, 2010, pp. 109.
Reviewed by Miroslav Svirčević*
No more than ten years after the 
death of Kemal Pasha Atatürk (1881–
1938), his life’s work, the Turkish secular 
nation state of the West-European type, 
has begun to be eroded through a slow 
but persistent and calculated revaluation 
of the doctrinal and ideological legacy of 
the former Ottoman Empire, involving 
the re-Islamization of Turkish society as 
its major ingredient. As the thin shell of 
orthodox Kemalism eroded, a basis was 
created for building a different social and 
political conjuncture in modern Turkey. 
In that way, according to many research-
ers concerned with contemporary geo-
political developments in the Near East 
and the Balkans, the stage was set for a 
neo-Ottomanist doctrine, unmistakably 
present in both the foreign and domestic 
policies of post-WWII Turkey. Because 
of its quite elusive features, the doctrine 
has not always been easy to pinpoint in 
Turkish politics. During the Cold War, 
neo-Ottomanism, being overshadowed 
by the prevailing ideological dichotomy 
marking international relations in divided 
Europe in the mid-twentieth century, was 
a marginal and almost unrecognizable 
phenomenon. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
collapse of the Communist bloc, and 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
communist Yugoslavia, neo-Ottoman-
ism has assumed a clearer ideological 
profile, which manifests itself differently, 
depending on the situation, but always 
along the lines of the same political 
agenda: strengthening of Turkey’s politi-
cal, economic and military influence on 
the countries in her “broader neighbour-
hood”, in fact those that once formed part 
of the Ottoman Empire, most of all those 
in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, the 
Near East and the Balkans. This political 
orientation of post-Cold War Turkey was 
as clearly observable under the president-
ship of Turgut Özal (1989–93) and Sulei-
man Demirel (1993–2000) as it is under 
Abudullah Güll (since 2007). Shaped and 
honed gradually, this political platform 
of Turkey’s contains some covert compo-
nents (pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism), even 
though Turkish statesmen generally tend 
to deny the presence of any trace of neo-
Ottomanism in it. Yet, the facts say dif-
ferently. 
Neo-Ottomanism is strongly present 
in Turkish politics (foreign and domestic), 
which has recently become observable in 
the Balkans as well. Darko Tanasković, an 
eminent Serbian Orientalist and diplo-
mat, is among the first in Serbia to offer 
a more comprehensive and a more so-
phisticated interpretation of the doctrine 
of neo-Ottomanism and Turkish foreign 
policy, presented in a recently published 
study symbolically titled Neo-Ottoman-
ism. Turkey’s Return to the Balkans. In a 
well-argued and convincing manner his 
study elucidates the strategy of Turkish 
diplomacy for the twenty-first century 
and, consequently, the roots of its cur-
rent political dynamism. The study is all 
the more worthy of attention and care-
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ful reading as the Turkish influence on 
Serbia’s domestic and foreign policies has 
become quite visible lately. It should be 
established, therefore, what is understood 
by the concept of neo-Ottomanism, what 
its ideological and political source is, and, 
finally, what the area of its impact is. 
Darko Tanasković sees neo-Ottoman-
sim as a distinctive ideological project of 
gradual re-Islamization of Turkish secular 
society and of dismantling the underlying 
premises of Kemalism, coupled with the 
marked strengthening of Turkey’s inter-
national position, which is manifested in 
various ways, depending on the changing 
historical and political circumstances after 
the Second World War. What he recog-
nizes as key determinants of the neo-Ot-
tomanist doctrine are: Islamism (but also 
pan-Turkism), pragmatism, and the use of 
double standards in Turkey’s foreign poli-
cy. Almost imperceptibly, but persistently 
and surely, they erode the country’s secu-
lar system, leaving behind mere façades of 
the Kemalist institutions, forms devoid of 
substance.
Tanasković suggests that the re-Is-
lamization of Turkish society forms an 
integral, and important, part of neo-Ot-
tomanism. Turkey is fertile ground for the 
process, because the secular system func-
tioning there for several decades lacks the 
necessary and widespread social support 
and legitimacy. This has been strongly felt 
in this part of the Balkans, notably in the 
project of radical Islamization of Bosnian 
Muslims presented in Alija Izetbegović’s 
Islamic Declaration of 1971, which, among 
other things, harshly criticizes Kemal 
Pasha’s secular system as a “European 
plagiarism” which turned Turkey into a 
second-rate country with little authority 
on the international scene.   
As the Kemalist system in fact does 
not mirror Turkish political reality, the 
legal and political position of the armed 
forces is markedly emphasized insofar as 
they are authorized to intervene should 
they assess that the government is violat-
ing the secular character of the state. Is-
lam, however, is so deeply rooted that it 
has never ceased being a key factor of per-
sonal and collective identity among the 
masses, and providing the guidelines for 
social life. Tanasković goes on to analyze 
the other two elements of neo-Ottoman-
ism, and finds that the doctrine is increas-
ingly reflected in everyday life and forms 
the backbone of Turkish diplomacy. 
Political practice in Turkey (and in 
some other Muslim countries) has shown 
that the implementation of the Western 
notion of parliamentary democracy soon-
er or later leads to (pro)Islamist forces 
coming to power in spite of the country’s 
constitutional secularism, a high level of 
secularization in public life and the pow-
erful position of the army as the only reli-
able keeper of Kemalism. This means that 
the achievements of Kemalism are in fact 
quite fragile and that the secular system 
can only be maintained through some 
kind of dictatorship under the guise of 
parliamentarianism and modernity. But, 
even as they dismantle secularism, Turkish 
politicians will never admit it publicly, nor 
will they renounce Kemal Pasha Atatürk 
and his achievements. Even less so before 
Western politicians, in whose eyes Turkey 
(as a NATO member) remains the most 
dependable partner among Muslim na-
tions and the best example that the West-
European ideas of modern democracy are 
implementable in a Muslim state. But, 
Tanasković suggests, the greater the num-
ber of Atatürk’s pictures hanging in Turk-
ish offices, the less Kemalism in Turkish 
public life.      
Finally, the neo-Ottomanist doctrine 
in Turkey’s foreign policy is characterized 
by the use of double standards, which de-
pends on concrete political interests. For 
instance, Turkey invaded northern Cy-
prus, an internationally recognized coun-
try, and recognized the self-proclaimed 
state of Kosovo. 
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The slowly crystallizing neo-Otto-
manist political doctrine was given its 
theoretical grounds and coherence by 
the incumbent head of Turkish diplo-
macy, Ahmet Davotoglu, in his book 
Depth Strategy: International Position of 
Turkey, published in 2001, practically the 
manifesto of Turkish foreign policy at the 
dawn of the twenty-first century. 
Tanasković suggests that Davutoglu’s 
concept of strategic depth is introduced 
as a key concept of his neo-Ottomanist 
theoretical paradigm. The concept im-
plies the historical and geographical depth. 
As the only legitimate successor to the 
history and geography of the Ottoman 
Empire, Turkey possesses a huge politi-
cal potential. She sits at the heart of the 
Eurasian geopolitical space, and as such 
has for centuries been a factor in all ma-
jor developments spilling over from the 
Near East into the Balkans and beyond, 
into the Catholic and Protestant regions 
of Europe. Accordingly, Davutoglu (and 
other proponents of the doctrine) refuses 
to put up with the clichéd description 
of Turkey, especially popular in West-
ern scholarship and publicist writing, as 
a “bridge between Europe and the Near 
East”. In his view, rather than a “bridge”, 
Turkey is the “heart” of Euroasia, its natu-
ral centre which, owing to her great his-
torical and geographical depth, is going to 
play a pivotal role in stabilizing the politi-
cal and economic situation in a vast area 
from the “Adriatic Sea to Central Asia”, 
as Suleiman Denirel used to put it. Tur-
key, Davutoglu goes on to say, possesses 
all necessary social potentials for playing 
such a role on a fundamentally changed 
international scene: a democratic sys-
tem, a young and dynamic population, a 
formed civil society, stable middle classes, 
a market economy, and a very respectable 
scientific and technological infrastructure. 
These potentials oblige Turkey to abandon 
her passive foreign policy and become in-
stead the architect of a new political and 
economic conjuncture, reappraising her 
cultural and historical heritage and the 
advantages of her geographical position. 
In other words, Davutoglu believes 
that Turkey should no longer be a periph-
eral nation whose political role amounts 
to being a “bridge” between civilizations. 
Rather she should pursue an active for-
eign policy and become a centre of politi-
cal decision-making. In order to achieve 
that, she needs to construct a new iden-
tity, suited to her new and ambitious 
role in the vast space of Eurasia. Break-
ing with the foreign policy of Kemalist 
Turkey, Davotoglu proposes partnership 
with the major powers (USA, EU, Rus-
sia, China) and the renewal of her sphere 
of influence, which happens to coincide 
territorially with the major provinces 
of the former Ottoman Empire. In that 
context, the domicile Muslim population 
of certain regions will serve as the “build-
ing material” for constructing Turkey as a 
new regional and global power.
It has already been said that the Cau-
casus, Central Asia, the Near East and the 
Balkans are the regions where contem-
porary Turkey is interested in renewing 
her political, economic and even military 
influence. Especially important among 
these is the Balkans, as it has always been 
the oft-questioned basis of “Turkish Eu-
ropeanism”. In his analysis of this aspect of 
the neo-Ottomanist doctrine, Tanasković 
takes a look at a very important essay of 
the Turkish political scholar Mehmet Ali 
Kılıçbay, “We already are Europeans”. The 
essay suggests that the war in Bosnia in the 
1990s was not triggered by strife between 
Christians and Muslims, nor was it a war 
of civilizations in Huntingtonian terms, 
but that it in fact was the most serious at-
tempt in modern history to drive Turkey 
out of Europe and into the East, to which 
she has never belonged and which she 
has always considered irrelevant. The es-
say makes plain that the neo-Ottomanists 
are in the process of constructing a new 
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identity for Turkey, mostly along the po-
litical and cultural lines of the former Ot-
toman Empire in the Balkans. For them, 
the Balkans is the primary sphere of in-
fluence, and their activities will be largely 
devoted to settling Balkan political issues, 
of course, in accordance with the interests 
of modern Turkey. It is indicative in that 
sense that official Turkey sees Serbia as a 
“neighbouring country”. 
Reminding his readers of the fact that 
the post-Ottoman period saw systematic 
obliteration of the Ottoman cultural leg-
acy in the Balkan countries, which Turkey, 
weak as she was at the time, was unable 
to counter, Davutoglu emphasizes that the 
process was the most vigorous in Greece 
and Bulgaria. That is why — the “Turkish 
Kissinger” goes on to say — it is necessary 
for Turkey to focus on two vital and tradi-
tional linchpins of the Turkish Ottomanist 
or pan-Turkist Balkan policy: the Bosniaks 
and Albanians. As they form the human 
basis for Turkey’s regenerated political and 
economic power, she should do whatever it 
takes to satisfy their political appetites. A 
strong Albania and a centralized Bosnia-
Herzegovina, to which now an indepen-
dent Kosovo should be added, are a pri-
ority of the Turkish agenda, because that 
is the only way for her to curb the influ-
ence of other powers in the region: Russia 
(through the Serbs and, possibly, Bulgar-
ians) and Germany (through the Slovenes 
and Croats). The arc stretching from Bihać 
in the west, across central and eastern Bos-
nia, Stara Raška (Sandžak), Kosovo, Alba-
nia, Macedonia and Kardzhali to Thrace is, 
for Davutoglu, a vitally important corridor 
to Turkey. Assuming that the Serbian goal 
in the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo was to 
severe that corridor, Davutoglu believes 
that it is vital to renew it. Otherwise, he 
argues, the Bosnian Muslims will be left 
exposed to the assimilatory influence of 
Croatia, while those in Sandžak and the 
Albanians in Kosovo will be left exposed 
to the influence of Serbia.
How carefully designed Turkey’s 
long-term foreign-policy approach to 
the Balkans is may be seen from the sec-
tion of Davutoglu’s book elaborating on 
the three concentric geopolitical circles 
within which Turkish influence of differ-
ent depths and intensities is supposed to 
be exerted. The first is the so-called In-
ner Circle, which encompasses Kosovo 
and Metohija (and thus Serbia), Albania 
and Macedonia; the second is the Middle 
Circle, encompassing Greece, Serbia, Bul-
garia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the third, 
Outer Circle, encompasses Croatia, Hun-
gary and Romania, and is not of primary 
interest to Ankara.   
What is of central importance to Tur-
key is that Albania and the entire Alba-
nian ethnic corpus should be as strong as 
possible. Albania must not be allowed to 
remain a weak and undeveloped country 
because, in that case, Italian and Greek 
presence would grow stronger, thereby 
co­­un­te­­­ring Turkish political ambitions 
and interests in the region. Davutoglu 
is acutely aware of the complexities and 
contradictions involved in Albanian-
Macedonian relations, and of the risk that 
their straining might open the way to 
Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian influences 
on a politically divided and, effectively 
partitioned, country such as Macedonia. 
Therefore, he argues, Turkey should give 
a boost to the shared state and help cre-
ate the conditions for the Albanians to be 
able to fully exercise their human rights 
in order that the integrity of this unstable 
country should be preserved.
Tactical priority in Turkey’s approach 
to the second geopolitical circle is to re-
spond actively and timely to any intention 
of these nations to establish closer mutual 
cooperation and agreements, and by initi-
ating counter-agreements to ensure that 
the balance of power is not disturbed to 
the detriment of Turkey and her Balkan 
protégés. It should be noted that Davu-
toglu does not question the alliance be-
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tween Belgrade and Athens, but rather 
takes it as a political fact which is not 
susceptible to political influence. What is 
politically feasible, however, is to ensure 
that Sofia remains outside of that alli-
ance. He fears the possibility and overtly 
suggests a proactive approach aimed at 
binding Bulgaria to Turkey as closely as 
possible. How successful Turkey has been 
in this may be seen from the fact that 
all unsettled disputes between Bulgaria 
and Turkey (and they are not few) were 
somehow pushed aside to help Bulgaria 
join the European Union in 2007, with 
the generous help of the Turkish minor-
ity party in Bulgaria, whose leader, Ahmet 
Dogan, was almost unfailingly a desirable 
political partner for all Bulgarian parties. 
Moreover, Bulgaria recognized indepen-
dent Kosovo, her representative “bravely” 
defended Kosovo’s right to independence 
before the International Court of Justice 
in The Hague, and her political leaders 
keep encouraging Albanian-Macedonian 
cooperation. It seems self-evident that 
Bulgaria’s motive in all that is to profit, at 
least partially, from the current geo-po-
litical situation in the Balkans, notably in 
eastern Macedonia.     
It may be added in conclusion that 
major powers, most of all the USA, Great 
Britain, France and Germany, do not ap-
pear to have anything against this turn in 
Turkey’s foreign policy. Nor does Rus-
sia seem to mind, while China appears 
to ignore it altogether. The view is often 
heard that Turkey (as a NATO mem-
ber) is merely a regional instrument in 
the hands of the USA and Great Britain, 
doing nothing else but fulfilling their po-
litical demands, while being permitted in 
return to “impose peace and order in her 
own backyard”. The view is a far cry from 
the truth. It is true that Turkey acknowl-
edges the interests and demands of the 
Anglo-Saxon nations. At the same time, 
however, she is ready to confront them if 
that is what her own strategic political in-
terests require. Turkey will never sacrifice 
them to please her patron overseas. It is 
in that context that some interesting po-
litical moves of the Turkish government, 
which came as an unpleasant surprise for 
the USA, should be looked at: the recall of 
the Turkish ambassador to the USA “for 
consultation” after US Congress passed 
the resolution terming the persecution 
of the Armenians during the First World 
War as a genocide; the straining of rela-
tions with Israel over the position of the 
Palestinians in Gaza; support extended 
to the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ah-
madinejad (overtly hostile to the USA); 
and joining Russia’s project for a southern 
gas pipeline. All this shows that Turkey 
strives for an independent foreign policy 
and that such a trend should be expected 
in the future.  
This is the central question for Ser-
bia’s national policy and diplomacy at this 
point. Concluding his analysis of Davi-
toglu’s depth strategy, Tanasković stresses 
that the neo-Ottomanist aspect of Turk-
ish foreign policy should not be looked 
at from a moralizing perspective, which 
is only prone to obscure what lies at the 
core of things. Neo-Ottomanism is nei-
ther good nor bad in itself. It may even 
have some degree of legitimacy. If it is all 
right for Germany to protect the interests 
of the Croats and Slovenes, and for Russia 
those of the Serbs, then why, Tanasković 
reasonably asks, would it not be all right 
for Turkey to claim the right to protect the 
interests of the Bosniaks and Albanians? 
This is a legitimate analogy to draw. Neo-
Ottomanism, therefore, should not be de-
nounced ahead of time. Serbia needs to 
take it into account as a political fact, and 
to strive for the maximum possible gain at 
the minimum possible loss in her relations 
with the new Turkey. Whether she will 
be successful depends most of all on her 
ability to recognize her own vital interests 
as well as the limits of her own strength. 
This requires a tremendous amount of 
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political realism and pragmatism. Should 
she be successful in coping with realities, 
she might achieve significant benefits. 
Should she fail, she will have no other to 
blame but herself, given that the picture 
of relations among major powers in the 
Balkans is completely clear. It is Serbia’s 
call now, and we can only hope that she 
will act prudently and timely. The com-
plexities of the modern world made plain 
in Tanasković’s remarkably inspiring book 
invite the reader to further and profound 
reflection. 
